Elk Creek Fire demonstrating high level of competence

The odor keeps getting stronger, and it is not burnt wood odor.

CO-JEX-Lower North Fork Rx Escape:


Ab,


I am someone who is pretty familiar with wildland fire operations in Jefferson County, CO. I was not part of the wildland fire response to this incident. It seems that information relating the to escape and the entrapment of residents is slowly being made public. Maybe it's too early to have this kind of discussion, but it's fresh in my mind right now so I'm going to bring up a few issues.

First, I commend Chief McGlaughlin for speaking publicly about what happened that afternoon. He is fresh into his position in a new fire district, which has had more than its fair share of "leadership issues" over the past few years. He appears to be facing the challenges head on.

The area of the fire was under a Red Flag Warning last Monday; but as most firefighters know, not all RFWs are created equal. This was an extremely critical fire day, as identified by the National Weather Service Storm Prediction Center. Some folks in Jefferson County have been looking into the history of these kind of days: spring or fall dry seasons, extremely critical fuel moisture, and very strong southwest winds. These conditions have created almost all of the large fires along the Front Range within the past 20 or 30 years. These folks have presented their preliminary findings to various wildland fire groups in the county, and made some recommendations (NOT official guidelines or rules). Rapid fire suppression is the key... if these fires are not "caught" within the first hour two, the only option is to look towards evacuations and structure protection where possible. Most of the folks involved in the initial response should have understood the situation... however, I am wondering the extent to which Chief McGlaughlin was or was not aware of this research.

The Denver Post article makes it pretty clear that the CSFS burn boss, who became the initial IC when the escape was declared (following standard CSFS procedures) was too focused upon suppression. It's not too hard to imagine the "human factors" that would contribute to that. Was he thinking about the "bigger picture" and the LIKELIHOOD that this fire was headed for a blowup?? The fact that the initial sizeup report indicated the fire had "low spread potential" suggests that he either did not understand the situation or was too focused on "catching it" to consider that.

I believe that the fire technically started in North Fork's fire district, but it was very close to both the Elk Creek and Intercanyon districts. Was there confusion/disagreement about who would take control of the fire? Radio traffic suggests there were early discussions about "Type 3 overhead." Perhaps the first responders recognized the potential consequences of the escape, the complexity and the need for a type 3 IC and command structure... but that leadership was not in place in those early hours
The Denver Post article makes it pretty clear: the escape occurred at about 1240, but evacuations were not ordered until about 1700, when the blowup was already starting. Apparently this was the point where the Elk Creek and North Fork commanders pointedly took control. But there was a clear "window of opportunity" to order and begin evacuations, which was missed...and it seems pretty likely that three residents would still be alive if steps had been taken earlier. Chief McGlaughlin has said as much. I bring this up not to point blame, but to point out that there are critical lessons to be learned from this incident. Some things need fixin' locally, and I'm sure there are plenty of other agencies who conduct Rx fire, or have Rx fires in their districts conducted by other agencies, who need to take heed. Agencies who conduct Rx fire will not like to hear it... but in my opinion, there need to be clear protocols for when a fire district or other fire agency takes over an escaped Rx fire. On extreme fire days such as this one, these protocols need to be less focused on protecting the agency who lit the fire, and more focused on protecting citizens.

Source

The CSFS burn plan is available here

Thanks jf1acai for the info.

Having spent some time in the area and to my way of thinking the controlled burn was in North Fork Fire district. When it went outside containment, it looks like it was still w/i NFF. When it jumped the drainage it looks like part was in Elk Creek Fire and to the east InterCanyon.

Have to agree with the above, there definitely was a failure in contacting residents soon enough and having the correct emergency alert notification info for all residents. And as I have said before, establishing IC and maintaining it or formally giving to another should have happened.

So very sad that three lives had to be lost and some did not receive the emergency alert notification. So many lessons to be learned from this experience.

I had the opportunity this morning to go up with one of the owners who lost their home and do some preliminary clean up and scope the area. I could clearly see the path the fire took as it rushed up the ridge. What really surprised me though was the amount of real estate that still could/can burn. So it is incumbent on all fire departments and jeffco sheriff to do their assessments and be prepared for the next one whatever ridge it turns out to be.

Thanks for all your input, mtntrekker.

I'm just blown away by the apparent lack of interest shown by most of the posters here, and on PC, after just a few days, in an incident that took 3 civilian lives, 26+ homes, disrupted the lives of 1000+ of our neighbors, etc.

I realize that most of those directly affected are too busy now trying to get their lives back together again, and/or don't have access to internet forums to talk about it, but I still am surprised that so few seem to be interested in finding out what went wrong in this incident, and how to correct that so that it doesn't happen again.

A few immediately blamed it all on CSFS, without adequate information IMO.

As more information becomes available, it appears to me that CSFS has a significant part of the responsibility, but there is more than enough to go around.

I think we should all be interested in finding out what really led to this situation, and trying to work out reasonable ways to reduce the chances of it ever happening again.

I think we owe that to those who lost their lives, property, etc.

But, that is just me.

I have not forgotten and have contacted officials in my area asking if it would be possible to do a test on the emergency alert notification system yearly.

I have not gotten a response back but if I do I will let you know.

I hope that those that were directly affected will share any information they have been given and like SC waiting for more of the official reports to come out.

I myself am waiting for the results of the official inquiries ........ and what explanation/compensation is provided for the screw-ups in this one

Seems like your mind is already made up......

As I have said before.....I don't know what went wrong with this fire but something definitely did.
I will continue to publicly question the timelines and answers or lack of answers until the truth is on the table.
We owe that to the people who lost their lives and property.