Among the problems found by independent safety experts:
*improper well design
*improper cement design
*early warning signs not properly detected, analyzed or corrected
*removing the pressure barrier -- displacing drilling mud with sea water 8,000 feet below the drill deck
*flawed design and maintenance of the final line of defense – the blowout preventer
I am interested in source and further information on these. I have heard of some, not heard of others.
Improper this and that is reminiscent of movie critics. There is always a better way to do something once the idea is out there. These safety experts are like a lot of safety experts, safety overkill. If they had their way, we'd all be wearing helmets inside our cars too. What I would say to all these folks is "Where were you when the page was blank?"
I'm not here to defend BP. Having worked for Shell so many years, I know how much they put into safety design, so I tend to listen when they have something to say. Clearly there are majors who do not agree with BP practices. Flawed design and maintenance of the blow out preventer? First of all, the maintenance issue is an area that likely deserves hits. The blowout preventer design? I think that is another matter all together. BP are pretty standard in their design. Another area that does concern is displacing drilling mud with seawater. This may be standard practice, but it does change the bottom hole weight of the drilling mud column and it clearly came back to bite them. Drilling mud is supposed to be heavy enough to balance the pressures at the bottom of the hole or in the reservoir. It did not do the job because a methane bubble escaped, meaning it (mud weight) was too light. To my way of thinking, the mud weight and functionality (or lack there of in this case) are the critical factors. Cement design, well design, etc. are BS. That is not what caused the failure. If you want to look at well design issues, you best know how deep casing was set, bottom hole pressures at the casing shoe, etc. etc. Also, please remember, this is a frontier area. Before the well went down, all these safety experts had NO data with which to access the risks involved. Now they do and like the movie critic, are there to identify faults.
My personal view is that BP is taking responsibility. There may have been some f*ck ups along the way, but that is not being reckless, it is simply a screw up that had dire consequences. As jf1acai pointed out, even people within the same company will approach things in different ways. It is part of the the nature of professionals. Even news reporters do not all approach their research and news gathering the same way and that is not an indictment for recklessness. Nor are differences of opinion in well design, cement design, etc. an indictment for recklessness ([of a person or their actions] without thinking or caring of the consequences of their actions). I'd be wiling to bet there was a lot of thinking going on not just by one individual but many with regard to well and operational design.
Good post Doc. Do you know any thing about SIL safety ratings for Oil rigs? I am used to that for power plant equipment controls, there are SIL1 to SIL4 ratings for back up safety systems and IEC standards to follow. I researched it a bit, but SIL seems to have more to do with electronics than mechanical devices. I imagine there must be some standards for Oil Rigs as there is for most any engineering project.
Wayne if you don't post your link, your data and conclusions will be disqualified, sorry. LOL
If you want to be, press one. If you want not to be, press 2
Republicans are red, democrats are blue, neither of them, gives a flip about you.
Among the problems found by independent safety experts:
*improper well design
*improper cement design
*early warning signs not properly detected, analyzed or corrected
*removing the pressure barrier -- displacing drilling mud with sea water 8,000 feet below the drill deck
*flawed design and maintenance of the final line of defense – the blowout preventer
I am interested in source and further information on these. I have heard of some, not heard of others.
Under Pressure to Block Oil, A Rush to Dubious Projects
The Louisiana berm project would be extremely expensive. The application from the state of Louisiana estimated the cost to be about $3.8 million per mile, or about $171 million for the initial 45 miles of the permitted project. In its comments on the state’s application, the U.S. Department of Interior notes that cost estimates for mobilizing sand in the area have already been produced for the planning of future barrier island restoration. Using these numbers, the Interior Department suggests the costs are likely to be closer to $500 million. Thad Allen, the U.S. Coast Guard admiral in charge of the spill cleanup, said Wednesday that BP has agreed to pay for construction of the 45-mile line of sand berms, which he estimated would cost $360 million.
A project that could cost as much as a half-billion dollars should warrant serious review. Yet it has been very difficult to find a public record or details of the proposed project design and how it was vetted.
WASHINGTON – Rep. Joe Barton , R-Arlington (TX), has backed away from his comments earlier today that the Obama administration had conducted a "shakedown" against oil giant BP.
Barton also retracted his apology to BP CEO Tony Hayward, a comment that hours earlier electrified a House committee hearing on the Gulf oil spill.
With an uprising brewing among fellow Republicans, Barton retreated from his statement.
"BP should bear the full financial responsibility for the accident on their lease in the Gulf of Mexico," Barton said in a written statement. "BP should fully compensate those families and businesses that have been hurt by this accident. BP and the federal government need to stop the leak, clean up the damage, and take whatever steps necessary to prevent a similar accident in the future."
He added: “I regret the impact that my statement this morning implied that BP should not pay for the consequences of their decisions and actions in this incident.”
Joe wrote: Good post Doc. Do you know any thing about SIL safety ratings for Oil rigs? I am used to that for power plant equipment controls, there are SIL1 to SIL4 ratings for back up safety systems and IEC standards to follow. I researched it a bit, but SIL seems to have more to do with electronics than mechanical devices. I imagine there must be some standards for Oil Rigs as there is for most any engineering project.
Wayne if you don't post your link, your data and conclusions will be disqualified, sorry. LOL
No I do not know anything about SIL safety ratings. What I do know concerning blow out preventers is that on every rig I was on, these were always test multiple times during drilling and again prior to reaching the reservoir. It would seem logical that the ball got dropped on this somewhere along the way. I said logical. I do not know if there were test conducted or not.
While I think the first link is generally good, taken in full context, it relies somewhat on the advantage of 20-20 hindsight. It also doesn't go into any detail regarding the
problems found by independent safety experts
. As Rockdoc noted, safety experts are heavy on overkill and also rarely completely agree with each other.
From what I have seen so far, I believe there is more than enough actual blame to go around to all involved. I also believe that blame is unfairly being placed in a number of areas where it is not deserved.
IMO, far too much time and energy is being used in attempting to place blame, and this distracts from the efforts to actually do something to stop the flow from the well; contain the oil which has already spilled; learn both the primary and secondary events which lead to it, so that attempts can be made to prevent it from happening again; and remediate the damage which has resulted.
Their somewhat (I'm trying to be gentle ) misguided PR attempts aside, I think that overall BP has done a very good job of responding to this incident. I cannot think of anyone who could have done better. Of course we wish that they had and were doing more, and I'm sure they do also. But, realitiy is as it is.
Again IMO, the White House and Congress could be much more productive at this stage by providing assistance rather than criticism.
Experience enables you to recognize a mistake when you make it again - Jeanne Pincha-Tulley
Comprehensive is Latin for there is lots of bad stuff in it - Trey Gowdy
Release date: 16 June 2010
BP announced today that oil and gas is flowing through a second containment system attached to the Deepwater Horizon rig’s failed blow out preventer (BOP).
This second system supplements the lower marine riser package (LMRP) cap containment system, which remains in operation. The new system is connected directly to the BOP and carries oil and gas through a manifold and hoses to the Q4000 vessel on the surface. The Q4000 uses a specialised clean-burning system to flare oil and gas captured by this second system.
Oil and gas collected from the BOP reached the Q4000 at approximately 1:00 am CDT (7.00 am BST) on June 16. Operations continue to stabilise and optimise the performance of the second containment system.
Information on the volume of oil collected and gas flared by the LMRP cap containment system is being updated twice daily on BP’s website, [url=http://www.bp.com" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;]http://www.bp.com[/url]. When measurements are available for volumes of oil and gas being flared by the Q4000, this information will be added to the updates on BP’s website.
Neither the new capture system nor the LMRP containment cap system has ever before been deployed at these depths and conditions, and their efficiency and ability to contain the oil and gas cannot be assured.
• Optimization of the dual system, LMRP Cap and the Q4000 Direct Connect, will continue over the next few days.
• For the first 12 hours on June 17 (midnight to noon), approximately 8,000 barrels of oil were collected and approximately 4,500 barrels of oil and 25.8 million cubic feet of natural gas were flared.
• On June 16, a total of approximately 14,750 barrels of oil were collected and approximately 3,850 barrels of oil and 40 million cubic feet of natural gas were flared.
• The Overseas Cascade continues lightering from the Enterprise.
) misguided PR attempts aside, I think that overall BP has done a very good job of responding to this incident. I cannot think of anyone who could have done better. Of course we wish that they had and were doing more, and I'm sure they do also. But, realitiy is as it is.
